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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
STRANGULATION OF THE AMERICAN RULE.
AN OVERVIEW OF PENDING
CONGRESSIONAL ATTORNEYS' FEES LEGISLATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Under the "Amencan Rule of awarding attorneys fees, each
party must pay hIs or her own litIgatIon expenses. 1 Courts, how
ever, may exerCIse theIr equitable power and award fees under the
bad faith,2 common fund 3 or common benefit4 exceptIons. In addi
tIon, fee awards may be granted when there IS statutory authonza
tIon. 5
It IS through the latter exceptIon that Congress has attempted
to restnct the applicatIon of the Amencan Rule." Congress has at
tempted thIs restnctIon by broadenmg the courts statutory author
IzatIon to award attorneys fees. There are numerous attorneys fees
bills pending m Congress. ThIs artIcle proVIdes an overVIew of
1. The Amencan Rule IS contrasted by the "English Rule whereIn the
award of attorneys fees IS proVided to successful litigants. See Alyeska Pipeline
Serv Co.
Wilderness Soc y 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) ("Amencan Rule");
Fleischmann Distilling Corp.
MaIer Brewmg Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967) ("Eng
lish Rule").
2. Under the "bad faith exception an award of attorneys fees IS appropnate
where the nonprevailing party has acted m bad faith, vexatiously wantonly or for
oppressive reasons. The bad faith doctnne has allowed the award of attorneys fees
when there was
willful disobedience of
court order.
or when the
nonprevailing party acted In bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive rea
sons.
Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co.
Wilderness Soc y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59
(1975).
3. Common fund awards are made where
prevailing party preserves or cre
ates fund for himself or herself as well as for others. The prevailing party may re
qUIre the beneficlanes of that fund to share In the attorney compensation. See Trus
tees of the Internal Improvement Fund
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
4. The common benefit doctnne, also known as the substantial benefit doc
tnne, IS an expansIOn of the common fund doctnne. Its Justification IS the same as
the common fund doctnne but its focus IS directed more toward non-monetary bene
fits. See Mills
Electnc Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-96 (1970).
5. There IS plethora of statutory exceptions to the Amencan Rule. Probably
the best known IS Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)
(1976). For an extensive listing of the statutory exceptIons see Cohen, Awards of At
torneys Fees Agamst the United States: The SovereIgn Is Still Somewhat Immune, 2
W NEW ENG. L. REV 177 184-91 (1979).
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those bills. 6 The basIs of the overVIew IS the bills referred to the
House Committee on the J udiclary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
LibertIes and the AdmlnIstratIon of JustIce. Pnmary focus IS on
Senate bill 265. Thls bill provIdes a model for an m-depth
discussIOn of the pending leglslatIon as well as a basls by whICh to
evaluate other attorneys fees bills. In addition, several Senate bills
whIch are movmg through Congress are reviewed. Finally a listmg
of all current bills are compiled m the appendix.

II.

BILLS REFERRED TO THE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE
ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

A.

S 265-"Equal Access to Justtce"

Senate bill 265,7 as are the other bills discussed m thlS article,
IS premIsed upon a fundamental philosophIcal concept of the Amer
Ican JUrIsprudence system. IndiVIduals who are poor must not be
denIed access to the Judiclal system. The bill IS deSIgned to award
litigation expenses, m certam CIrcumstances, to certam parties who
prevail agamst the United States provlded that the government's
action was not substantlally Justified. The bill would allow recovery
of attorneys fees m almost all admInIstrative and JudicIal CIvil pro
ceedings mvolvmg the government. 8
The title, "Equal Access to Justice Act, clearly enunCiates the
Act's fundamental purpose. The Act lS deslgned to elimmate
deferral to unreasonable governmental actIOn because of mordinate
costs. The Senate IS concerned that certam mdivlduals may not ex
erCIse theIr legal nghts because they slffiply cannot afford the ex
pense. In additIOn, there IS the concern that government will effec
6. The listing contained In thiS article IS current to October 25, 1979. Undoubt
edly additional legtslation on thiS tOPIC will be submitted pnor to publication of thiS
article. See note 110 mfra.
7 S. 265, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) was reported to the Senate from the Sen
ate Committee on the JudiCiary on July 20, 1979. It was called up by unammous
consent on July 31, 1979. On the same day the Senate conSidered and passed the
measure by
94-3 vote. Senators Chiles (D., Fla.), Proxmue (D., Wis.) and Roth
(R., Del.) voted nay Senators Bayh (D., Ind.), Ford (D., Ky.) and Huddleston
(D., Ky.) did not vote, although the CongressIOnal Record Indicates that were Sena
tor Bayh present he would have voted yea. 125 CONGo REc. S1O,924 (daily ed. July
31, 1979).
8. Civil actlOns sounding In tort are excluded from coverage. S. 265, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(d)(l) (1979). In additlOn, the bill IS Intended to augment not
supercede eXisting legislation. Id.
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tuate acqUlescence by economICally brow-beatmg its opponents. 9
ThIS concern was expressed repeatedly m the legIslatIve debate on
the bil1. 1o The Senate also concluded that every prevailing litIgant
agamst the United States asserts a public as well as a pnvate cause
of action. Thus, as quasI-pnvate attorneys generals, prevailing
nongovernment litigants should be provIded with litIgation com
pensatIon. 11
The bill allows awards of attorneys fees m certam admIlllstra
12
tIve and JudiCIal proceedings. 13 With regard to agency proceed
9. "Congress finds that certam mdivlduals
may be deterred from seekmg
revIew of or defending agamst, unreasonable governmental action because of the ex
posure mvolved.
S. 265, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1979).
"Congress further finds that because of the greater resources and expertise of the
Federal Government the standard for an award of fees agamst the United States
should be different from the standard governmg an award agamst pnvate litigant,
In certaIn situations. Id. § 2(b).
"It IS the purpose of thIS Act
(1) to dimlmsh the deterrent effect of seekmg revIew of, or defending agaInst,
governmental action by provIding In specified situations an award of attorney fees.
[d. § 2(c)(I).
10. The Senators concern over the harshness and potentially arbitrary applica
tion of bureaucratic regulations and red tape whICh IS directed toward the small
bUSInessperson was eVIdent throughout the remarks on the bill. Only several exam
ples need be cited to replicate the tone of the argument.
If bureaucrats knew that more of theIr actIOns would be subjected to ques
tIons In court, I believe that the tendency of many bureaucrats to be care
less, arbitrary, and Irresponsible would cease. S. 265 provIdes the tools that
are sorelv needed by most Amencans to fight back when unreasonable rules
and regulations are wrongly enforced.
Senator Dole (R., Kan.) 125 CONGo REC. S10,915 (daily ed. July 31, 1979).
The legIslation would mark the begInmng of new stage. It would mark the
readjustment of the tensIOn whIch eXIsts between the citizen and the Fed
eral agencIes whICh govern theIr lives.
[Wje also woke up to the fact that the average Amencan, the small bUSIness
man, the average citizen, IS now beSIeged with regulatory bureaucracy, with
arbitrary deCISIOns, with small fines from the numerous agencIes that are In
charge of beIng sure that we are healthy and safe, and cannot afford to fight
theIr own Government.
Senator Domemcl (R., N.M.) 125 CONGo REC. S1O,916 (daily ed. July 31, 1979).
11. Senator DeConcInI (D., Anz.) stated thIS concept dunng the floor debate
when he observed that the bill recogmzes that those who choose to litigate an Issue
agamst the Government are not only representing theIr own vested Interests. They
are also refimng public policy, correctIng errors
and helpmg to define the limits
of Federal authority. In short, these people are servmg public policy and public
purpose. 125 CONGo REC. S1O,914 (daily ed. July 31, 1979).
12. The bill specifically excludes admmlstrative adjudicatIOn InvolVIng the es
tablishment or fiXIng of rate or In cases InvolVIng license grantIng or renewal. S.
265, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(a) (1979).
13. See note 8 supra.
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mgs,14 litIgatIon expenses may be awarded to a prevailing party If,
however, the agency determmes that its actIon was substantIally
Justified" or that specIal cIrcumstances make an award of attor
neys fees unjust, no award need be made. IS The burden of prov
mg a substantIally Justified actIon, however, IS placed on the
agency 16 The agency IS also authonzed to reduce or deny an
award if the other party engaged m conduct whICh unduly and un
reasonably protracted" the final resolutIon. 17 A party dissatisfied
with the agency s determmatIOn may appeal to a federal court. The
court may deny the petitIon for appeal, m whICh case no further
appeal IS allowed, or the court may modify the agency s declSlon,
but only if the agency abused its discretIon. 18 Should an agency or
a court award fees, the bill calls for the expenditure to be taken
from the agency s eXIstmg budget. 19 The agency IS not allowed to
have a separate budgetary item specifically deSIgned to pay ex
penses mcurred under the Act.
With regard to JudicIal proceedings,20 a prevailing party many
CIvil litIgatIon21 brought by or agamst the United States may be
awarded reasonable attorneys fees. As with the admInIstrative pro
ceedings, the court may not award fees if it "finds that the positIon
of the United States was substantially Justified or that speCIal CIr
cumstances [would] make [the] award unJust."22 The court may
also deny or reduce the award if the nongovernmental prevailing
party "unduly and unreasonably protracted the final resolutIOn of
the matter m controversy "23
The court may award fees for adjudication conducted at the
admInIstratIve level unless the government's position was substan
tIally Justified or unless the eXIstence of speCial CIrcumstances
would make the award unJust. 24 As with the preVIOUS section, an
agency whIch IS reqUIred to pay a fee award may not have a speCIal
14. The bill amends 5 U.S.C. § 5 (1976) by adding an additIonal section to it
covenng the awarding of attorneys fees. S. 265, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1979).
15. Id.
16. D. DECONCINI, EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE, S. REP No. 253, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 21 (1979).
17 Id.
18. S. 265, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1979). It IS assumed that modification of
an award could be either an Illcrease or decrease.
19. Id.
20. The biJIls deSigned to amend 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976).
21. Cases III tort are not Illcluded. See note 8 supra.
22. S. 265, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1979).
23. Id.
24. Id.
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appropnatIon for such an expenditure. The award must be paId out
of the agency s eXIstIng budget. 25
The bill bases compensatIon on the prevailing market rate, but
limits that compensatIon rate to a maxImum of $75 per hour There
are proVIsIons for a rate mcrease if there IS an mcrease m the cost
of livmg or a specIal factor necessitatmg such an mcrease. 26
The bill broadly defines government to mclude the United
States, or any agency or officIal actmg m hIS or her officIal capac
ity 27 ThIS factor IS Important when it comes tIme to pay the award
smce the award will be paId from an agency s budget.
The bill carnes with it a three-year sunset provlSlon. 28 It does,
however, allow for the completIon of pending litIgatIon should the
program not be contmued. 29 The bill also establishes vanous eco
nomIC utilizatIon parameters. A party eligible for a fee award IS de
fined as an mdiVIdual who has not accumulated a net worth m ex
cess of $1 million at the tIme the adjudicatIOn was mitIated or the
cIvil actIon filed. In addition, any sole owner of an unmcorporated
busmess or any partnershIp, corporatIon, assocIation or organIZa
tIon whICh has a net accumulated worth of $5 million at the time
the adjudicatIon was mitIated or the CIvil actIon was filed IS ex
cluded from the fee proVIsIon. 30 There IS, however, one exception
to thIS latter category An agncultural cooperatIve IS consIdered a
valid party regardless of economIC worth. 31
25. [d. § l(a).
26. An agency, by regulation, or court, based on discretion, may mcrease the
award because of an mcrease m the cost of livmg or the advent of special circum
stance such as the "limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceeding m
volved.
[d. §§ 3(a), 4(a). As Senator Kennedy (D., Mass.) notes, the mtent of the
committee was that "the prevailing market rate apply regardless of the attorneys fi
nanCial arrangement with thelT clients. 125 CONGo REC. SIO,923 (daily ed. July 31,
1979).
27 S. 265, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (1979).
28. A sunset provIsion reqUires that
legislative body affirmatively continue
the provIsions of bill. OtherWise, the bill' prOVISIOns are termmated on specified
date. In the case of S. 265, the sunset prOVISIOn terminates the bill' prOVlSlons at the
conclUSIOn of three years. ThiS sunset provIsion clearly demonstrates the expenmen
tal nature of the bill. At the conclUSIOn of the three years, Congress has an opportu
nity to re-evaluate the effectiveness of the bill. If Congress determmes that Imple
mentation of the sunset proVISIOn comcldes with its legislative mtent, Congress
could continue the bill' proVISIOns through enactment of new legislation. Cases
ansmg pnor to the sunset date, but not reachmg final disposition by that date, are
still covered by the bill until final disposition. See note 16 supra, at 8.
29. S. 265, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(c) (1979).
30. Id. §§ 3(a), 4(a).
31. Id. ThiS exception was not m the ongmal bill whICh came out of
committee. It was added as an amendment durmg the floor debate. The amendment
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It is difficult to dispute the philosophical basis of the bill. Yet,
as with any piece of legislation, numerous concerns have been
raised. While the bill is directed toward equal access to justice, the
practical basis of the bill is directed against government intrusion
and bureaucratic red tape. 32 If the Senate's primary concern was
total access to equal justice, it should award fees to any
nongovernmental party engaged in litigation with the govern
ment. 33 If the bill is actually designed to make "the bureaucracy
more accountable in the exercise of its powers and more responsive
to its citizens' needs, "34 then Congress should eliminate the sub
terfuge of this bill and enact powerful legislation which would re
sult in the discharge of bureaucrats who have wronged others.
While the bill purports to authorize fee awards to prevailing
parties, it limits those awards to actions in which the government
was not substantially justified. The legislative history, however, in
dicates that the action must be unreasonable. 35 The substantially
was sponsored by Senator Hayakawa (R., Cal.). In his proposal he stated:
The net worth of the cooperative as an entity is not significant for the pur
pose of the definition. This amendment would remove the net worth test for
agricultural cooperatives which meet the definition of the Agricultural Mar
keting Act. [42 U.S.C. § 1141 j(a) (1976)]. In substance, compliance with the
tests would insure that only legitimate self-help agricultural associations
formed by the farmers would be entitled to this treatment under the bill.
125 CONGo REC. SlO,918 (daily ed. July 31, 1979).
32. As Senator McClure (R. Idaho) stated:
[T]he American people are so frustrated with their Government's intrusion
into every aspect of their lives we in Congress, whose responsibility it is to
set the policy of this government, must respond.... [R]egulations are too of
ten subject to arbitrary interpretation and application by Federal functiona
ries who are now vested with very broad discretionary powers.
125 CONGo REC. SlO,920 (daily ed. July 31, 1979).
33. See Dunlap, Attorneys' Fees Against Government Defendants: Economics
Requires A New Proposal, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 311 (1979).
34. Senator DeConcini (D., Ariz.), 125 CONGo REC. SlO,914 (daily ed. July 31,
1979).
35. The legislative history is repleat with references to reasonable and unrea
sonable actions by the government as the basis for the award.
Senator DeConcini (D., Ariz.): "It is also intended to affirmatively encourage cit
izens to challenge actions which they believe to be unreasonable or irresponsible."
125 CONGo REC. SlO,914 (daily ed. July 31, 1979).
Senator Culver (D., Iowa): "Unless the agency can prove its position was reason
able, it would have to pay the attorneys fees ...." Id. at SlO,915.
Statement by Senator Ford (D., Ky.) quoting the Senate Judiciary Committee re
port:
"The test of whether or not a Government action is substantially justified is
essentially one of reasonableness. Where the Government can show that its
case has a reasonable basis both in law and fact, no award will be made.
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justified standard will be ripe for definitional debate and litigation.
Critics see this as a drawback to the Act. 36 In addition, special cir
cumstances may excuse the awarding of a fee. The determination of
such special circumstances will be left to the agency or the courts
since neither the Act nor the legislative history provides enough
guidance. The legislative history does state that an award should
not be made when "equitable considerations dictate"37 or when the
government is advancing a good faith argument but that an award
should be made in cases in which there is a "novel extension of the
law to areas and there is insufficient legal precedent to establish
the reasonableness of the agency action. "38
Not only are the standards vague, but also the government has
the burden of proving that its action was substantially justified, or
that special circumstances existed. 39 Critics suggest that placing the
burden on the government will "chill" enforcement of federal laws
and increase trial time. 4o An alternative measure, proposed by the
United States Department of Justice, would utilize the standard set
down by the United States Supreme Court in Christiansburg Gar
ment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 41 If the
prevailing party can demonstrate an unreasonable or frivolous ac
tion on the part of the government, then attorneys' fees would be
However, where the Government's position is not reasonably based in the
law or in fact, fees will be awarded."
Id. at SI0,918.
Several Senators, however, used the substantially justified phraseology, merely
replicating the text of the Act. For example, Senator Thurmond (R., S.C.), id. at
S10,920 and Senator Nelson (D., Wis.), id. at S1O,922.
36. Letter from John H. F. Shatluck, Director, and Karen Christensen, Legisla
tive Counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union, Washington, D.C. to Hon.
Edward M. Kennedy (July 12, 1979) (hereinafter cited as ACLU):
The standard of "substantially justified" lends it self [sic] to numerous dif
ferent interpretations. Although the drafters of S. 265 intend the standard to
cover unreasonable and harassing government action, the standard is danger
ously vague. . . . substantial judicial time will be wastefully expended in
gleaning what Congress intended by this language. If S. 265 is intended to
apply to only unreasonable or frivolous cases, it should state so explicitly.
37. Note 16 supra, at 7.
38. Senator Kennedy (D., Mass.) 125 CONGo REc. S1O,923 (daily ed. July 31,
1979).
39. The Report stated "[t]he committee believes that it is far easier for the
Government, which has control of the evidence, to prove the reasonableness of its
action than it is for a private party to marshal the facts to prove that the Government
was unreasonable." Note 16 supra, at 6.
40. ACLU, supra note 36, at 2.
41. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
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awarded. 42 The Senate rejected the use of the Christiansburg
criteria as "inadequate because it simply would not overcome the
strong disincentives to the exercise of legal rights which now exist
in litigation with the Government. "43
An important concern of the critics revolves around the poten
tial chilling effect the bill may have on the assertive enforcement of
federal laws. Enforcement may be limited because of the economic
position in which individual agencies may find themselves. This
criticism seems to lack the substance found in other expressed con
cerns. For example, the Justice Department asserts, without
supportive material, that "the costs of this legislation in terms of
the deterrent effect on legitimate law enforcement efforts could
well exceed its cost in dollars and cents."44 Legislative history,
however, indicates that bureaucratic administrators might become
more effective if there is a slight chill. 45
Budgetary considerations are another area of concern. The es
timated cost of the bill over the experimental three-year period
will be in excess of $367 million. 46 The legislative history, how
ever, indicates a concern about the cost of litigation to the
businessperson, but fails to discuss the cost to the government. 47

42. The Department of Justice's position and a copy of its proposed bill was
sent to the House Committee on the Judiciary subsequent to the passage of S. 265 in
the Senate. Letter from Alan A. Parker, Assistant Attorney General to Peter W.
Rodino, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (Octo
ber 17, 1979) (hereinafter cited as Justice).
See also ACLU, supra note 36, at 3; Letter from Mark Green, Director, Nancy
Drabble, Staff Attorney, Public Citizen, Washington D.C. to Judiciary Committee
Members (July 9, 1979) (hereinafter cited as Public Citizen).
43. Note 16 supra, at 6.
44. Justice, supra note 42, at 3. See also ACLU, supra note 36, at 2; Public Citi
zen, supra note 42, at 2.
45. Senator Nelson (D., Wis.) seems to believe a slight 'chill' will be invigorat
ing for the bureaucrat:
[Wlhere the Government agency goes ahead without a strong case against a
business; or where it is proceeding carelessly; or where it now imposes a
fine, secure in the knowledge that its action will not be challenged because
of the cost involved, I would be very happy if the enactment of this legisla
tion caused some chilling effect on Government regulatory efforts.
125 CONGo REC. S1O,922 (daily ed. July 31, 1979).
46. Note 16 supra, at 9-12. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the cost
at $108 million for 1980, $122 million for 1981, and $137 million for 1982. Id. at 10.
47. Representative of the comments made during the floor debate are those by
Senator Dole (R., Kan.), "Ironically, it appears that American justice has become too
costly for the average American budget," and by Senator Helms (R., N.C.) "Justice
simply will not be done when one side cannot afford to fight." 125 CONGo REC.
510,915, 10,922 (daily ed. July 31, 1979).
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In fact, it appears that, according to at least one Senator, the fed
eral government is the ultimate deep pocket. 48 The budgetary as
pects of S. 265, however, are a major concern of the critics. Funds,
assert the critics, will be directed away from law enforcement ac
tivities. 49 In addition, the American Civil Liberties Union con
tends:
[T]axpayers will be paying three times for enforcement of federal
statutes-first for the enforcement activity, second for attorney
fees where enforcement efforts are unsuccessful, and third
through an effective subsidy to businesses which are even now
allowed to deduct costs of litigation, including attorney fees,
from their income taxes. This price is simply too high to ask the
taxpayers to pay. 50

The Department of Justice concurs that the cost of the legislation is
too high. It states: "[T]he annual cost of S. 265 would likely exceed
$125 million-an amount equal to 30 percent of the current
operating budget for the federal courts. "51
The cost of this bill may have an unfortunate result despite its
philosophical appeal. Agencies, faced with expending unbudgeted
monies will either cut back on established programs or inflate fu
ture budgetary requests. In addition, the government agencies may
find it more cost efficient to abdicate enforcement of legislatively
mandated programs or to abdicate asserting the reasonableness of
their position in order to save money. In some cases, it may cost
less merely to give up. Such a result would not only be counter to
the intent of the legislation, but also may unjustly enhance the eco
nomic position of the prevailing party.
The final concern of the critics is that the legislation sweeps
too broadly. It brushes aside the American rule too suddenly. 52 It
48. Remarks by Senator McClure (R., Idaho):
State and local government, and therefore taxpayers, normally operate on
tight budgets, as do labor organizations and business corporations. However,
the Federal Government is not under similar constraints. Normally, the
agency or bureau is funded to bring suits, to enforce the laws, to implement
social policies. The imbalance is clear.
125 CONGo REc. SIO,921 (daily ed. July 31, 1979).
49. ACLU, supra note 36, at 3.
50. Id.
51. Justice, supra note 42, at 2. The letter goes on to state that the Congres
sional Budget Office only estimated direct costs of the legislation and did not in
clude indirect costs such as government attorney and court personnel time. Id. See
also ACLU, supra note 36, at 3.
52. See ACLU, supra note 36, at 1.
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applies to too many areas, from contract disputes to environmental
protection enforcement. 53 The Senate does not appear to address
the issue of impact, except where it focuses on the impact exerted
on businesspersons.
The concerns raised by critics, however, do not and should
not negate the important philosophical intent of the legislation. If
citizen cynicism of the government and government harassment of
the citizens are cured by the passage of S. 265, perhaps the effort
and expense will be worthwhile.
B.

H.R. 2846 a Bill Entitled Equal Access to Justice

H.R. 2846 is the second in a trilogy of Equal Access to Justice
bills pending in the House's Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
Liberties and the Administration of Justice. Its basic structure is
identical to S. 265. 54 There are, however, notable exceptions.
While H. R. 2846 limits the parties who may take advantage of the
fee award,55 it does not include either the sole owner of an
unincorporated business or an agricultural cooperative. The most
significant difference between the two bills is that the House bill
authorizes payment of the fee award to be made by the General
Accounting Office (GAO) instead of the specific agency involved in
the administrative or judicial controversy. 56 This method of pay
ment diminishes the 'chilling effect' in enforcement that may occur
with agencies that are required to pay fee awards directly from
their budget.
53. [Tlhe legislation would apply in contract disputes, social security mat
ters, land condemnation suits, environmental enforcement actions, and al
most every other type of case that the Government litigates without any
showing that the availability of a fee-shifting provision is necessary to ena
ble litigants effectively to vindicate their rights in such cases.
Justice, supra note 42, at 2.
54. H.R. 2846 is based upon the same philosophical concept as S. 265. In his
remarks in the House, Representative Udall (D., Ariz.) stated the premises of the
bill:
We all recognize that our society has grown from a simple agrarian cul
ture .... Accompanying that growth has been an increase in the size of gov
ernment and in the number of Government rules and regulations. And as
this regulatory maze increases in complexity the costs of dealing with it and
with the Government have increases [sicl as well. ... the Equal Access to
Justice Act insures that when that regulation is onerous, perhaps unjust or
unnecessary, small firms will be able to go to court for an objective, unbi
ased hearing.
125 CONGo REC. H7423-24 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1979).
55. H.R. 2846, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1979).

56.

Id.
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H.R. 2846 contains potentially limiting language when it au
thorizes fee awards for "agency adjudication." S. 265 uses the
broader term "proceeding." While both bills are apparently at
tempting to address the same issue, it would be a broader focus to
use the term "proceeding."
Another difference between S. 265 and H.R. 2846 is that the
latter does not contain a provision dealing with action initiated be
fore, but not completed by the end of the three-year experimental
sunset provision. The exclusion of such a provision may protract lit
igation in hopes that it will result in either default or less than ade
quate settlement.

C.

H.R. 5342 a Bill Entitled "Equal Access to Justice Act"

The final Equal Access bill follows S. 265 more closely than
did H.R. 2846. There are, however, two notable distinctions be
tween H.R. 5342 and S. 265. First, the maximum allowable attor
neys' fee rate is $100 per hour57 as compared to $75 per hour con
tained in S. 265 (and H.R. 2846). Second, and more importantly,
the standard used to judge the government's action is changed
from a "substantially justified" basis to a "clearly justified" basis. 58
Since there is, however, no legislative debate available on the bill,
it would be inappropriate to speculate whether this standard will
translate into the "reasonableness" standard that the Senate felt de
fined the substantially justified standard.
D. H.R. 302 a Bill to Provide That in Civil Actions Where the
United States Is Plaintiff, a Prevailing Defendant May Recover a
Reasonable Attorney's Fee and Other Reasonable Litigation Costs
This bill59 is simplistic in form and approach. In any civil ac
tion, a prevailing nongovernmental party is to be awarded reasona
ble attorneys' fees and litigation costs. The bill's lack of compre
hensiveness leaves numerous questions unanswered. From whose
budget is the prevailing party paid? Does United States terminol
ogy include agencies and officials acting in their official capacity?
Does the term civil action exclude administrative proceedings?
The indefiniteness of the bill, however, does not detract from
its philosophically appealing aspect. Defendants, regardless of
57.
58.
59.
the 96th

H.R. 5342, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1979).
Id. § 4(a).
H.R. 302 is identical to several other bills introduced in the House during
Congress: H.R. 436, 670, 1365, 1384, 2371, 3513.
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wealth, may obtain reasonable fee awards provided that they pre
vail against the government.

H.R. 3516 a Bill to Provide for the Recovery by the Prevailing
Party of Attorneys' Fees from the United States in Civil Actions
Where the United States Is a Party Which Does Not Prevail
E.

This bill, while similar in approach to H.R. 302, broadens the
scope of the award by including an award for prevailing in a civil
action regardless of whether the nongovernmental party is a plain
tiff or a defendant. As with the previous bill, however, the concep
tual framework of the bill leaves many important questions
unanswered.

F. H.R. 3517 a Bill to Authorize the Payment of Attorneys' Fees
in Tax Cases
Cited as the "Taxpayer's Attorney Fee Award Act of 1979,"
the bill authorizes the awarding of reasonable attorneys' fees to
nongovernmental prevailing parties where tax liability is an issue.
A prevailing party apparently may be either a plaintiff or defend
ant. 60

C. H.R. 5467 a Bill to Amend Title 35, United States Code to
Provide That, Except in Exceptional Cases, Attorneys' Fees Should
Be Awarded in Cases InvolVing Patent Infringements
The substantive portion of the bill amends section 285,61 by
inserting in lieu of the existing phraseology the sentence: "The
court, except in exceptional cases, may award reasonable attorney's
fees to the prevailing party." This bill demonstrates the broad and
sweeping desire by members of Congress to limit the application of
the American rule.

H. H.R. 5009 a Bill to Provide That Attorneys' Fees And Other
Reasonable Costs Shall Be Reimbursed to Taxpayers Who Substan
tially Prevail in Any Proceeding, Litigation, or Court Action Which
Is Brought By or Against the United States for the Determination,
Collection or Refund of any Tax, Interest, Penalty, or Other Mat
ter Arising Under the Internal Revenue Code
60. See notes 73-90 infra and accompanying text (discussion of 5.1444, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (a more comprehensive tax hill)).
61. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976) currently reads: "The court in exceptional cases may
award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party." ld.
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This bill is a variation of S. 265. Its focus is limited to tax is
sues. While the bill is entitled "Taxpayers' Litigation and Equity
Award Act of 1979," its purpose is identical to that of S. 265. In
this case, the economic disparity between government and individ
uals may deter the individuals or organizations from seeking reve
nue or defending against governmental action. 62 Thus, the purpose
of the Act is to diminish the deterrent effect of such disparity by
providing, in specified situations, the litigation costs involved in as
serting a position against the government.
In order to accomplish its objective, the bill provides for the
awarding to the prevailing or substantially prevailing party of rea
sonable attorneys' fees in any proceeding, litigation or court action
arising under the Internal Revenue Code. 63 If the government
withdraws from the action, a party is considered to have substan
tially prevailed. 64
The bill provides a different method of determining the limita
tion of the award than has been found in previous bills. Reasonable
award costs may not exceed $20,000. In addition, however, there is
an alternative computation method. It provides that the reasonable
cost, if greater than $20,000, may not exceed the monies expended
by or allocated to the United States. There is a limitation on who
may use this latter fee award formula. A party, such as an individ
ual, a partnership, a corporation, an association or organization,
must have net assets less than $1 million at the time the action was
commenced, in order to take advantage of the second fee award
formula. Reasonable attorney rates will be based upon the prevail
ing market rate. 65
The bill defines "United States" broadly to include any agency
and officials acting in their official capacity.66 In other bills where
the term "United States" has been broadly defined, the expendi
ture for the award comes from the agency's budget. This approach
is only partly true in this bill. The bill calls for the expenditure to
be made through the GAO "unless the basis for an award is a find
ing that the United States acted in bad faith or unreasonably in
which case the award shall be paid by the Internal Revenue Serv
ice out of its appropriation. "67
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

H.R. 5009, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1979).
ld. § 3(a).
Id.
ld. § 3(b)(c).
ld. § 3(c)(1)(ii).
ld. § 3(F).
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Because of the bill's language, it would appear that the termi
nology "through the General Accounting Office" means that the
GAO does not serve as a conduit for the monies awarded, but is
the paying agent in all cases except where the agency's position
was unreasonable or in bad faith. If the latter circumstances
occurred, the agency would pay the award. The bill does not indi
cate whether the agency may set up a separate budgetary item to
cover a potential fee award.
H.R. 5009 is broader in scope than S. 265 in that it does not
require unreasonable governmental action as a condition to an
award. The chilling effect on the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
however, may be the same as the chilling effect on agencies cov
ered under S. 265, if it must pay the award because of an unrea
sonable position. 68
This bill, unlike S. 265, does not state where the burden of
proof is placed in order to determine the unreasonableness or bad
faith action of the agency. The distinction does not affect the pre
vailing party as much as it will affect the IRS and the GAO. Pre
sumably, both would prefer the other to pay. It would be ironic if
one of the agencies had to litigate the question of reasonableness of
action in order to determine which agency paid the prevailing
party.
The award may be appealed to a federal court. If it is, the
court may reduce, deny or increase the award. An increase in
award may be implemented by the court when the United States
engages in actions which serve to unduly and unreasonably protract
the final resolution of the issue, or where special circumstances
make the award unjust. Likewise, a reduction or denial of the
award to the prevailing party may be made for the same reasons. 69
Many of the concerns expressed about S. 265 are not present
in H.R. 5009. For example, the prevailing party will recover
merely by prevailing unless the award is unjust. In the latter in
stance, the burden of proof required to deny or reduce the award
would appear to be on the agency. The chilling effect on the IRS
is, compared to S. 265, potentially diminished, although not elimi
nated because the party will recover regardless of the reasonable
ness of the agency's action. 70
68. See notes 7-53 supra and accompanying text (discussing S. 265, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979)).
69. H.R. 5009, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(c) (1979).
70. S. 1444 is more likely to get favorable treatment than H.R. 5009. See notes
73-90 infra and accompanying text (discussing S. 1444, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)).
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I. H.R. 1780 a Bill to Provide for the Recovery By a Prevailing
Defendant in Federal Criminal Cases of a Reasonable Attorney's
Fee and Other Reasonable Litigation Costs

H. R. 1780 is designed to accomplish in criminal law what pre
vious bills have been designed to accomplish in civil and adminis
trative law, the awarding of fees to prevailing parties. Payment is
made to any defendant in a federal criminal case "who is not con
victed after trial, whose prosecution is dismissed with prejudice, or
whose conviction is ultimately vitiated (unless such conviction is vi
tiated by pardon on grounds other than innocence) .... "71
The purpose of this bill is apparently the same as the other
bills discussed. It, like others,72 suffers from lack of elaboration.
The bill's specifics must await committee hearings and floor debate.

III.

BILLS WHICH ApPEAR TO BE MOVING

A. S. 1444 a Bill to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
and Title 28 of the United States Code to Provide for the Award of
Reasonable Court Costs, Including Attorneys' Fees, to Prevailing
Parties in Civil Tax Actions, and for Other Purposes
S. 1444 may be viewed as a complement to S. 265. Its title,
the "Taxpayer Protection and Reimbursement Act," is certainly not
as philosophically oriented as S. 265. While the basis of the bill,
however, is similar,73 there are several significant differences be
tween them. The focus of S. 1444 is narrow, applying to cases
brought under the Internal Revenue Code. 74 Despite the narrower
71. H.R. 1780, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
72. H.R. 302, 3516, 3517, 5407, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
73. The same philosophical purpose is to be found in the two bills. During his
introduction of S. 1444 Senator Baucus (D., Mont.) stated:
While recognizing that IRS generally exercises its authority justly and
with restraint, the fact remains that in an organization as large and complex
as IRS, which must administer a myriad of complicated tax laws, errors are
bound to occur. There are instances where IRS has acted arbitrarily, where
certain taxpayers may feel subjected to IRS harassment or abuse.... Such
taxpayers, who have to endure the turmoils of litigation through no fault of
their own, must still pay the legal expenses incurred in the course of court
action. . . . In such circumstances, the expense of litigation often makes a
court victory meaningless for taxpayers.
125 CONGo REc. S8,712 (daily ed. June 27, 1979).
74. During the legislative debate on S. 265, the discussion focused, for a short
while on S. 1444. Senator Baucus (D., Mont.) proposed an amendment which would
limit the affect of S. 265 or the internal revenue laws for six months after the enact
ment of S. 265. This amendment was adopted and became § 7(b) of S. 265.
Since there are differences in the two bills, and S. 265 would only apply to areas
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focus of the bill, S. 1444 is attempting to broaden existing fee re
covery legislation. Currently, nongovernmental prevailing parties
may recover attorneys' fees when they are involved in a civil action
or proceeding involving the Internal Revenue Code. The authority
for this is from the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976. 75 As noted in the legislative history of S. 1444, there are lim
itations to the current award availability. First, courts have limited
recovery to prevailing defendants. 76 Second, courts have allowed
awards only where the government has "acted in bad faith, for pur
poses of harassment or vexatiously or frivolously. "77
In its attempt to broaden current legislation, the bill incorpo
rates many of the same provisions as can be found in S. 265, as
well as some different provisions. For instance, the bill specifies a
maximum $20,000 reasonable award limitation for anyone civil ac
tion or proceeding. 78 In addition to attorneys, any individual au
thorized to practice before the tax court may be awarded fees. 79
In order to be eligible for an award, the nongovernmental
party must prevail. Prevailing entails meeting two conditions.
First, the bill requires that the party "is sustained (whether by ju
dicial determination or agreement of the parties) as to all, or all but
an insignificant portion, of the amount in controversy, or ... if no
amount is in controversy, . . . as to all, or all but an insignificant
portion, of the issue or issues presented. . . . "80 Second, the prenot previously covered by fee award legislation, Senator Baucus implied that the six
month delay would allow enough time for him to assure passage of S. 1444. As the
Senator stated, .. lilt is also my understanding that if S. 265 is enacted, that the provi
sions of S. 1444 will supersede the provisions of S. 265 inasmuch as S. 265 states that
all speci.fic attorneys' fees provisions will supersede the general provisions contained
in this bill." 125 CONGo REC. SlO,919 (daily ed. July 31, 1979).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
76. Remarks of Senator Baucus (D., Mont.):
First of all, courts have been in virtual agreement that reimbursement
for attorneys' fees may only be made where the taxpayer is the defendant....
Second, courts have held that even if the taxpayer is the defendant in a
civil tax litigation and prevails against the Government, that taxpayer never
theless may recover attorney's fees from the Government only if the Govern
ment acted in bad faith, for purposes of harassment or vexatiously or frivo
lously. Few taxpayers are able to meet such a highly restrictive burden of
proof, even though they prevail in the litigation.
125 CONGo REC. S8,713 (daily ed. June 27, 1979).
77. [d. It should be noted that the defendant has the burden of proving that the
government acted vexatiously, frivolously or in bad faith, for purposes of harassment.
78. S. 1444, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 101(a), 201 (1979).
79. [d. § 101(a). Section 201 of the bill (applicable to 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976))
does not contain this wording.
80. S. 1444, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101(a), 201 (1979).
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vailing party must establish that the position of the United States
was unreasonable. 81 Reimbursement is thus available to both
nongovernmental plaintiffs and defendants in most civil actions and
proceedings under the Internal Revenue Code. 82
There appears to be a third hurdle for the prevailing party to
overcome. While the terminology of the Act, buttressed by legisla
tive history, indicates an award may be made for prevailing at the
administrative level,83 it appears that the prevailing party must go
to court in order to prove that the position of the agency was un
reasonable, and thus be eligible for the award. There is no provi
sion for the agency to make the award. While the sponsor's intent
to "encourage the parties to settle thereby lessening court conges
tion"84 may be a laudable idea, the provisions of the bill do not
accommodate it.
Payment of the award is to be made from the general appro
priations of the agency involved. 85 The granting or denial of the
award, however, may be appealed. 86
The bill carries with it a sunset provision,87 but has an ex
tended retroactive implementation date. Its provisions apply to
civil tax actions or proceedings instituted after December 31, 1978,
and before January 1, 1983. 88
Although S. 1444 is closely related to S. 265, there are differ
ences between the bills. Several of the concerns expressed about
S. 265 are eliminated by S. 1444. In particular, the chilling effect
on the agency is diminished partly because of the burden of prov
ing unreasonable action by the government lies with the prevailing
nongovernmental party. The bill is not breaking new ground as

81. [d.
82. The bill does limit the award by excluding certain civil actions and pro
ceedings. These relate to various actions for declaratory judgment. See S. 1444, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a) (1979).
83. The Act calls for an award in the case of any civil action or proceeding. [d.
Senator Baucus remarked during the introduction of the bill, "Furthermore, the rule
that a party can be sustained either by judicial determination or settlement of the
parties encourage the parties to settle thereby lessening court congestion." 125
CONGo REC. S8,713 (daily ed. June 27, 1979). A broad and appropriate reading of
these words indicates that resolution of the issue at the administrative level would
lead to the award of reasonable fees.
84. 125 CONGo REC. S8,713 (daily ed. June 27, 1979).
85. This would most likely be either the Internal Revenue Service or the Just
ice Department. S. 1444, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a) (1979).
86. [d.
.
87. See note 28 supra.
88. S. 1444, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 103,203 (1979).
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much as it is expanding old ground. It is merely extending the def
inition of "prevailing party" from that found in the Civil Rights At
torney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 to include nongovernmental
plaintiffs as well as defendants. This expanded definition may cost
the taxpayers, as a whole, more money. 89
The bill's sponsor claims that the bill "provides needed protec
tion and assistance to those parties who become embroiled in court
disputes with [the] IRS through no fault of their own, but does not
penalize [the] IRS for fair, responsible, and reasonable perfor
mance of its duties. "90 Time, congressional debate and possible im
plementation will determine if such an objective can be achieved.

B. S. 1385 a Bill to Amend Title 28 of the United States Code to
Provide for the Payment of Reasonable Attorneys' Fees and Other
Costs in Certain Civil Actions
S. 1385 is another hybrid of S. 265. It has distinguishing char
acteristics. An attorney's fee award may be given to a nongovern
mental prevailing party who is a defendant in an action brought by
the government and to a nongovernmental prevailing plaintiff who
brings an action against the government "in connection with the
collection or recovery of any internal revenue tax or of any penalty
or other sum under the internal revenue laws. "91
The bill's intent is to expand the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976 by removing the "bad faith" burden of proof
required to be shown by nongovernmental prevailing defendants
and by allowing plaintiffs in IRS cases to be awarded fees. The em
phasis is on prevailing, not prevailing against an "unreasonable"
position.
Party is defined as "any individual who had at the time the
civil action was filed, net assets less than ... [$1 million] and any
partnership, corporation, association, or organization that em
ployed, at the time the civil action was filed, not more than one
hundred persons. "92 This definition seemingly leaves a large area
for a party to maneuver. A partnership of two persons with assets
in excess of $1 million could be awarded the fee. If the partnership
had assets in excess of $50 million, there would be an apparent in
consistency between the intent of the limitation and its practical
89. Since S. 1444 has not reached the same stage as 5. 265, no Congressional
Budget Office Cost Estimate is available.
90. 125 CONGo REC. 58,713 (daily ed. June 27, 1979).
91. S. 1385, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
92. Id.
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application. There is no limit, other than reasonableness, on the fee
award, although the rate is calculated on the prevailing market
rate. 93
The bill broadly defines "United States" to include any agency
and official acting in his or her official capacity.94 In so doing, the
bill is consistent with most other bills because it calls for any award
to be paid from the losing agency's existing budget. No special allo
cations are allowed. 95

C. S. 330 a Bill to Amend Title 38, United States Code, to Estab
lish Certain Procedures for the Adjudication of Claims for Benefits
Under Laws Administered by the Veterans' Administration; to Ap
ply the Provisions of Section 553 of Title 5, United States Code, to
Rulemaking Procedures of the Veteran's Administration; to Provide
for Judicial Review of Certain Final Decisions of the Administrator
of Veteran's Affairs; to Provide for the Payment of Attorneys' Fees
S. 330, the "Veterans' Administration Adjudication Procedure
and Judicial Review Act," is a comprehensive bill covering areas in
addition to the awarding of attorneys' fees. 96 This overview, how
ever, will focus on the attorneys' fees provision.
The bill allows the Veterans' Administration (VA) to award rea
sonable attorneys' fees for services before that agency for claims
made in connection with VA related laws. The bill, however, has a
unique method of determining compensation levels. It does not al
Iowa fee award in excess of $10 if the claim is resolved prior to the
receipt of a statement of the case. 97 If the claim is resolved after
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. The bill has four major sections designed to provide for judicial review of
Veteran Administration (VA) decisions (title III) and the payment of attorneys' fees
(title IV). In addition, the bill requires that the VA complies with the Administrative
Procedures Act (title II) and clarify and codify existing adjudicatory procedures
(title I).
97. The legislative history is illuminating on this particular point. Senator
Cranston (D., Cal.), provides an in depth review of the background of title IV regard
ing attorneys' fees. It appears that the internal claim procedures of the Veterans Ad
ministration do not require the claimant to have the services of a lawyer during the
initial stages of processing a claim. Once a claim is filed, the VA performs most of
the background investigation work and makes a determination. If the claimant dis
agrees with the finding, the claimant need only file a notice of disagreement in order
to obtain a review. Should this second review not be to the satisfaction of the claim
ant, the VA will prepare and send to the claimant a statement of the case. This state
ment contains: (A) a summary of the evidence on the issues in disagreement; (B) a
citation of the legal basis for the determination and (C) a decision of the issues in
controversy.
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the receipt of a statement of the case, the administrator may ap
prove an award not in excess of the lesser of the fee agreed be
tween the attorney and the claimant or $500. 98 If, however, no fee
is payable unless the attorney prevails, the award is limited to "25
percent of the total amount of any past-due benefits awarded on
the basis of the claim. "99 If the claimant is not satisfied with the re
sult of the VA proceedings, there may be an appeal to the United
States District Court. lOO A prevailing claimant is entitled to reason
able attorneys' fees or, if a contingent fee arrangement was en
tered, an amount not to exceed 25 percent of the total due. lOl If
the claimant does not prevail, attorneys' fees may still be awarded
by the court "taking into consideration the extent to which there
could have appeared to have been a reasonable probability of suc
cess for such an action at the time it was filed. . . . "102 The maxi
mum allowable recovery available to the nonprevailing attorney is
$750. 103 The attorney's fee provision allowed by this bill results in
an assessment against the veteran's claim and not against the Vet
erans' Administration. l04 In addition, a prevailing party is broadly
defined to include a claimant who is granted "all or any part of the
relief sought. "105 If the attorney questions the award of the fees,
that issue may be appealed, but only to determine if the Adminis
trator's action was an abuse of discretion. 106
It is interesting to note that the ten dollar fee had historical precedent dating
back to the Civil War and World War I. It seemed to Congress that "lawyers of that
day were unscrupulous and were taking unfair advantage of veterans by retaining an
unwarranted portion of the veterans' statutory entitlement in return for very limited
legal assistance." 125 CONGo REC. S12,712 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1979).
98. S. 330, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401 (1979).

99. Id.
100. Id. §§ 4025-29.
101. Id. § 401.
102. Id.
103. Id. The legislative history of this Act places a limitation on the courts in
the awarding of this fee. "[Tlhe $750 fee allowable under this section is not to be re
garded as the amount to be approved automatically but rather that the court should
act so as to discourage attorney representation in cases lacking in any significant
merit by approving fee amounts at lower levels when appropriate." 125 CONGo REC.
S12,713 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1979).
104. The Congressional Budget Office produced a cost estimate of S. 330. It
concluded that enactment of the attorneys' fee title would entail no cost. Obviously,
this is because neither the VA nor the United States is required, as with other bills,
to pay for attorneys' fees.
105. S. 330, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401 (1979).
106. Id. The "abuse of discretion" standard was placed in the bill because the
standard "would serve to discourage frivolous challenges to a fee approval or chal
lenges in arguable cases in which there may be disagreement but the Administrator's
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s.

330 is a unique attorneys' fees bill. It is not designed to
provide the "equal access to justice" that the previously discussed
bills provide. Perhaps this is because, and the legislative history
bears this out, the role of the VA is viewed by Congress as assist
ance oriented rather than advocacy oriented. 107 The major congres
sional concern over this bill appears to be the judicial review
issue. lOS
IV.

CONCLUSION

Alexis de Tocqueville asserted that in a democracy, "Govern
ment is not a benefit, but a necessary evil. "109 Congress is appar
ently attempting to minimize the effects of this evil by the force of
economics. Attorneys' fees legislation is an attempt at curtailing the
bureaucratic giant that Congress has helped to create while at the
same time providing an economic and philosophical incentive to
the American people to stand up and fight. In so doing, Congress
is sounding the death knoll of the "American Rule." Two hundred
years of common law is being strangled by the potential enactment
of attorneys' fees legislation. The merits of such a move will be left
to others to discuss.

Leslie A. Williamson, Jr.
judgment is clearly not without reasonable foundation." 125 CONGo REC. SI2,713
(daily ed. Sept. 17, 1979).
107. See, e.g., 125 CONGo REC. S12,721 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1979).
108. [d. (remarks of Senator Humphrey (R., N.H.)).
109. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 238 (1961) (published in
English 1835).

APPENDIX
ATTORNEYS' FEES BILLS INTRODUCED DURING THE 96TH CONGRESS
AS OF OCTOBER 25, 1979110
H. R. 162-A bill to provide for judicial review of administrative determi
nations made by the Board of Veterans Appeals.
H. R. 204-A bill to provide for the safeguarding of taxpayer rights.
H. R. 25~A bill to amend chapters 5 and 7 of title 5, United States
Code, to require formal rulemaking procedures in the establishment of
grant, loan, benefit, and contract practices, to authorize payment of ex
penses to certain participants in administrative proceedings, to waive
sovereign immunity where judicial relief other than money damages is
sought, and to require the establishment of enforcement procedures for
grant-in-aid programs.
H. R. 28~A bill to amend chapters 5 and 7 of title 5 of the United
States Code to provide for the award of reasonable attorney fees, expert
witness expenses, and other costs reasonably incurred in proceedings
before federal agencies.
H. R. 436-A bill to provide that in civil actions where the United States
is a plaintiff, a prevailing defendant may recover a reasonable attorney's
fee and other reasonable litigation costs.
H. R. 66~A bill to amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 to provide that any employer who successfully contests a citation
or penalty shall be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee and other rea
sonable litigation costs.
H. R. 670--A bill to provide that in civil actions where the United States
is a plaintiff, a prevailing defendant may recover a reasonable attorney's
fee and other reasonable litigation costs.
H. R. 687-A bill to amend title II of the Social Security Act to provide
that attorney's fees allowed in administrative or judicial proceedings un
der that title (or under title XVIII of such act), in cases where the
claimants are successful, shall be paid by the Secretary of Health, Edu
cation, and Welfare rather than deducted from the amounts awarded
claimants.
H. R. 966-A bill to amend title XVI of the Social Security Act to pro
vide that attorneys' fees allowed in administrative or judicial proceed
ings under such title, in cases where the claimants are successful, shall
be paid by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
H. R. 1005-A bill to amend the Magnuson-Moss Federal Trade Commis
sion Improvement Act to extend the protections contained in such Act
to owners of new passenger motor vehicles.
110. The following bills have been introduced into Congress since October 25,
1979: S. 751; S. 1991; H.R. 5200; H.R. 5337; H.R. 5837; H.R. 5843.
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H. R. 1023-A bill to amend the Miller Act to authorize the payment of
attorney fees and litigation cost to a prevailing plaintiff from perform
ance bonds furnished by federal contractors.
H. R. 1064-A bill to provide for the safeguarding of taxpayer rights.
H. R. 1365-A bill to provide that in civil actions where the United
States is a plaintiff, a prevailing defendant may recover a reasonable at
torney's fee and other reasonable litigation costs.
H. R. 1378-A bill to amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 to provide that any employer who successfully contests a citation
or penalty shall be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee and other rea
sonable litigation costs.
H. R. 1384-A bill to provide that in civil actions where the United
States is a plaintiff, a prevailing defendant may recover a reasonable at
torney's fee and other reasonable litigation costs.
H. R. 1503--A bill to amend title 38 of the United States Code to allow
judicial review of decisions made by the Administrator of the Veterans'
Administration.
H. R. 1813--A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to establish a
Court of Veterans' Appeals and to prescribe its jurisdiction and func
tions.
H. R. 1838-A bill to provide for judicial review of administrative deter
minations made by the Board of Veterans Appeals.
H. R. 2170-A bill to provide for the reimbursement of legal expenses
incurred by the City of Fairfax with respect to a 1971 entry and search
by employees of the Federal Government.
H. R. 2361-A bill to amend the Act entitled An Act to provide for the
termination of federal supervision over the property of the Klamath
Tribe of Indians located in the State of Oregon and the individual
members thereof, and for other purposes, approved August 13, 1954
(25 U.S.C. 564w-2) to provide for federal reimbursement to such tribe
of reasonable litigation expenses incurred by such tribe.
H. R. 2371-A bill to provide that in civil actions where the United
States is a plaintiff, a prevailing defendant may recover a reasonable at
torney's fee and other reasonable litigation costs.
H. R. 2596-A bill to amend chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code
(commonly known as the Administrative Procedure Act), to permit
awards of reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses for public par
ticipation, in federal agency proceedings, (and for other purposes).
H. R. 2659--A bill to amend title 28 of the United States Code to pro
vide for an exclusive remedy against the United States in suits based
upon acts or omissions of the U.S. employees, to provide a remedy
against the United States with respect to constitutional torts, to estab
lish procedures whereby a person injured by a constitutional tort may
initiate and participate in a disciplinary inquiry with respect to such
tort.
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H. R. 3389-A bill to amend chapter 19 of title 38, United States Code,
to permit the unrestricted assignment of a beneficiary's interest in the
proceeds of a Government Life Insurance policy in cases involving con
tested claims, and to increase the amount an attorney may receive for
representing a claimant in such cases; to authorize the Administrator to
establish a program of dividends for certain types of National Service
Life Insurance.
H. R. 3424--A bill to deter the charging of replacement and non
replacement fees by blood banks.
H. R. 3466-A bill to amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 to provide that any employer who successfully contests a citation
or penalty shall be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee and other rea
sonable litigations costs.
H. R. 3515-A bill to provide that in civil actions where the United
States is a plaintiff, a prevailing defendant may recover a reasonable at
torney's fee and other reasonable litigation costs.
H. R. 3814--A bill to amend the Act of December 22, 1974.
H. R. 3866-A bill to provide for the distribution of certain funds appro
priated to pay judgments in favor of the Delaware Tribe of Indians and
the Absentee Delaware Tribe of Western Oklahoma in Indian Claims
Commission dockets 27-A and 241, 289, and 27-B and 338.
H. R. 3884--A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to pro
vide for payment by the Government of all reasonable litigation ex
penses to prevailing taxpayers in legal action.
H. R. 3929-A bill to amend title 28, United States Code, to require that
the United States reimburse defendants for the costs incurred in the
defense against any civil action filed by the United States on behalf of
any Indian or Indian tribe.
H. R. 4047-A bill to clarify the standards pertaining to unreasonable at
torney delay and to expand the sanctions for such conduct.
H. R. 4257-A bill to help states assist the innocent victims of crime.
H. R. 4297-A bill to amend section 1875 of title 28, United States Code,
with respect to the appointment and compensation of counsel for a ju
ror claiming a violation by his employer of rights guaranteed by such
section.
.
H. R. 4321-A bill to amend the Social Security Act to reform the pro
gram of aid to families with dependent children, to make improvements
in the standards for eligibility and benefits in the program of supple
mental security income and to proVide for the improved administration
of both programs, to make related amendments to the Internal Reve
nue Code of 1954.
H. R. 4584--A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to au
thorize the payment of attorneys' fees to taxpayers who prevail in tax
litigation.
H. R. 4674--A bill to promote the foreign policy of the United States by
strengthening and improving the Foreign Service of the United States.
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H. R. 476~A bill to amend title 28 of the United States Code to make
the United States liable for damages, arising from certain nuclear tests
at the Nevada Test Site, to individuals residing for a year in the af
fected area and having cancer, to individuals present at the site during
a test, and to certain sheep herds.
H. R. 4827-A bill to prohibit the appropriation or use of funds for the
compensation of attorneys, witnesses, or experts for intervening or
participating in any rulemaking proceeding of any Federal agency un
less such appropriation is specifically authorized by law.
H. R. 4927-A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to establish a
Court of Veterans' Appeals and to prescribe its jurisdiction and func
tions.
H. R. 5008-A bill to provide for judicial review of administrative deter
minations made by the Administrator of the Veterans' Administration;
to apply the provisions of chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code, to
the rules, regulations, and orders of the Veterans' Administration; to
provide for the use of a reasonable fee for attorneys in rendering legal
assistance to veterans with claims beforct the Veterans' Administration.
H. R. 5087-A bill to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act.
H. R. 5103-A bill to provide for better access to the Federal courts for
small businesses and others with small to moderate size claims, to ex
pand the duties of the Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Admin
istration.
H. R. 5262--A bill to amend the Act of December 22, 1974 (88 Stat.
1712; 25 U. S.C. 640d).
S. Res. 9~A resolution authorizing payment out of the contingent fund
of the Senate of expenses incurred by Senator Morgan in supporting a
motion to quash certain subpoenas served in the case of Zenith Radio
Corporation against Matsushita Electric Industrial Company, Limited.
S. 209--A bill to amend the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 and the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 for the purposes of sim
plifYing, clarifYing, and improving federal law relating to the regulation
of employee benefit plans, and to foster the establishment and mainte
nance of plans.
S. 251-A bill to amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
to insure equal protection of the laws for small business and to provide
that any employer who successfully contests a citation or penalty shall
be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee and other reasonable litigation
costs.
S. 270-A bill to amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
to insure equal protection of the laws for small business and to provide
that any employer who successfully contests a citation or penalty shall
be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee and other reasonable litigation
costs.
S. 300-A bill to restore fair and effective enforcement of the antitrust
laws.
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S. 326-A bill entitled the Taxpayers' Bill of Rights Act.
S. 695-A bill to amend title 28 of the United States Code to provide for
an exclusive remedy against the United States in actions based upon
acts or omissions of United States employees, and to amend title 5 of
the United States Code to permit a person injured by a constitutional
tort to initiate and participate in a disciplinary inquiry of the offending
act or omission.
S. 754--A bill to amend chapter 19 of title 38, United States Code, to
permit the unrestricted assignment of a beneficiary's interest in the
proceeds of a Government Life Insurance policy in cases involving con
tested claims, and to increase the amount an attorney may receive for
representing a claimant in such cases; to authorize the Administrator to
establish a program of dividends for certain types of National Service
Life Insurance; to authorize the Administrator to use a flexible interest
rate in cases where the beneficiary of Government Life Insurance re
ceives the proceeds of such insurance under certain settlement options.
S. 955-A bill to provide for the safeguards of taxpayer rights.
S. 1077-A bill to amend the Act of December 22, 1974, to relocate cer
tain members of the Navajo and Hopi tribes.
S. 1187-A bill to amend title 28 of the United States Code with regard
to the appointment and compensation of counsel for jurors claiming a
violation by their employers of certain rights guaranteed by such title.
S. 1290--A bill to amend the Social Security Act to reform the program of
aid to families with dependent children, to make improvements in the
standards for eligibility and benefits in the program of supplemental se
curity income and to provide for the improved administration of both
programs, and to make related amendments to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954.
S. 1291-A bill to amend title 5 of the United States Code to improve the
procedures for agency rule making, to require agencies to adhere to a
pro-competition standard, to require the Congress and the President to
review certain regulatory agencies, and to provide public participation
funding.
S. 1450--A bill to promote the foreign policy of the United States by
strengthening and improving the Foreign Service of the United States.
S. 1466-A bill to provide for the distribution of certain funds appropri
ated to pay judgments in favor of the Delaware Tribe of Indians and
the Absentee Delaware Tribe of Western Oklahoma in Indian Claims
Commission dockets 27-A and 241, 289, and 27-B and 338.
S. 170l-A bill to amend the Magnuson-Moss-Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act to extend the protections contained in such Act to
owners of new passenger motor vehicles, and for other purposes.

